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Torts - Actions Between Husband And Wife
"Whether a man has laid open his wife's head with a bludgeon,
put out her eye, broken her arm, or poisoned.her body, he is no
longer exempt from liability to her on the ground that he vowed at
the alter to 'love, cherish, and protect' her. We have progressed that
far in civilization and justice."' The purpose of this comment is to
examine whether we have in fact "progressed that far."
The inability of husband and wife to sue each other for a tort
arose out of the common law doctrine of legal identity. This doctrine
made it impossible for one spouse to be civilly liable to the other for
an act which would be a tort in the absence of the marital relationship.
The basis for the doctrine is obscure, although several sources have
been suggested. Among these is the natural law concept of the family
as a unit of government with the husband, physically the stronger, as
the head; another is the organization of the feudal system; and a third
is the position of the pater-familias in the Roman law.2 Whatever its
origin, by the eighteenth century courts of equity had established an
inroad in the doctrine by giving the wife a separate equitable estate.
This development was followed by a wave of legislation in the nine-
teenth century known as the Married Women's Property Acts, or
Emancipation Acts, which were intended, primarily, to secure to a
married woman a separate legal estate.3 The question of the ability of
husband and wife to sue each other today depends considerably upon
the judicial interpretation of the Married Women's Act in the parti-
cular jurisdiction, in respect to its effect upon the common law. In
twenty-one jurisdictions individual legislation permits designated
actions between husband and wife.4
Prior to 1910 the courts of this country had generally sustained
the right of a wife to sue her husband for torts against her separate
property.5 The early decisions reflect a considerable distrust for such
an innovation in the relation of husband and wife, but since the
Married Women's Acts were, in general, expressly designed to give the
married woman a separate legal estate, with the rights and duties
necessary to its maintenance, the majority of courts have tended to
permit such actions. For example, it has been held that the wife can
maintain an action against her husband for the conversion of her
1 Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N. C. 516, 105 S. E. 206 (1921).
2 BRYCt, STUDIES IN HiSTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE 819 (2nd ed. 1901).
3 McGurdy, Torts in Domestic Relation in selected essays on family law 396
(1950).
4 VERNuR, AMmC FAMILY LAWs § 180 (1938).
5 Note, 26 COL. L. Rlv. (1926); Comment, 4 FORD. L. REv. 475 (1935).
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separate property," for ejectment to recover possession of her separate
estate,7 or for replevin.8 Actions by the husband have been much
rarer but the same result has been reached, as in the case of a suit
by the husband against his wife for conversion of his personal
property.9 The courts, however, that had passed upon the right to sue
the spouse for a personal tort had denied the existence of such a right.10
These decisions merely followed the general rule that in the absence
of express statutory permission there existed no such right of action.
In 1910 a majority of the United States Supreme Court construed
the Married Women's Act of the District of Columbia 1 in the case of
Thompson v. Thompson,'2 and arrived at a decision in accord with
the existing authority by holding that such a right did not exist. Since
that time the weight of authority has continued to recognize the com-
mon law disability of husband and wife to maintain personal tort
actions against each other.'3 Nevertheless, opposition to this position
was not long in coming. Scarcely four years from the time of the
opinion in the Thompson case, the Supreme Court of Connecticut
made the doctrine of the dissenting justices the basis of a direct hold-
ing in favor of such an action. 14 By 1926 several courts had adopted the
minority position, including the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 15 and
6 Eshom, c- Eshom, 18 Ariz. 170, 157 P. 974 (1916) ; Walker v. Walker, 215 Ky.
154, 284 S.W. 1042 (1926); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 154 Mich. 100, 117 N.W.
598 (1908).
7 McDuff v. McDuff, 45 Cal. App. 53, 187 P. 37 (1919); Goodwin v. Goodwin,
172 Misc. 118, 13 N.Y.S. 2d 894 (1939); Humphreys v. Strong, 141 Va. 146, 126 S.E.
194 (1925).
8 Bruner v. Hart, 178 Okla. 222, 62 P. 2d 513 (1936); Notes v. Snyder, 4 F. 2d
426, (D. C. Cir. 1923), 41 A. L. R. 1052.
9 Eddleman v. Eddleman, 183 Ga. 766, 189 S.E. 833 (1937).
10 Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 75 N.W. 287 (1899); Strom v. Strom,
98 Minn. 427, 107 N.W. 1047 (1906).
11 D.C. CoDE § 43 (1929).
12 218 U. S. 611 (1910), Justices Harlan, Holmes, and Hughes dissented.
13 Thompson v. Thompson, note 12 supra; Ewald v. Lane, 104 F. 2d 222 (D.C.
Cir. 1939); Cubbison v. Cubbison, 73 Cal. App. 2d 437, 166 P. 2d 387 (1946); Car-
michael v. Carmichael, 53 Ga. App. 663, 187 S.E. 116 (1936); Broaddus v. Wilken-
son, 281 Ky. 601, 136 S.W. 2d 1052 (1940); Harvey v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co.,
6 So. 2d 744 (La. Ct. of App. 1942); Anthony v. Anthony, 135 Me. 54, 188 A. 724
(1937); Callow v. Thomas, 322 Mass. 550, 78 N.E. 2d 637 (1948); Kircher v. Kircher,
288 Mich. 669, 286 N.W. 120 (1939); Keralis v. Keralis, 213 Minn. 31, 4 N.W. 2d 632
(1942); Scales v. Scales, 168 Miss. 439, 151 So. 551 (1934); Lang v. Lang, 24 NJ. Misc.
26, 45 A. 2d 822 (1946); Tanno v. Elby, 78 Ohio App. 21, 68 N.E. 2d 813 (1946);
Fisher v. Diehl, 156 Pa. Super Ct. 476, 40 A. 2d 912 (1945); Lunt v. Lunt, 121 S.W.
2d 445 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938); Comstock v. Comstock, 106 Vt. 50, 169 A. 903 (1934) ;
Staets v. Co-Operative Transit Co., 125 W. Va. 473,24 S.E. 2d 916 (1943); McKinney
v. McKinney, 59 Wy. 204, 135 P. 2d 940 (1943).
34 Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 A. 889 (1914); reaffirmed in Bushnell v.
Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 A. 432, 44 A.L.R. 794 (1925).
15 Wait v. Wait, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N.W. 475, 48 A.L.R. 276 (1926).
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this tendency has continued to grow. In 1937 New York amended its
laws to provide for such an action, 16 and North Carolina, 17 Okla-
homa,' 8 and South Dakota' 9 now also permit such action. In fairness
it must be said that in North Carolina and South Dakota, as in New
York, such actions are permitted as a result of legislative action.
When we examine the opinions of several jurisdictions that are
cited as comprising the weight of authority, it becomes evident that
several of them can be given very little weight. For example in
Louisiana, New Jersey, Texas, and Vermont the statutes dealing with
the rights of married women either expressly forbid such actions or
expressly allow only actions between spouses concerning property
rights. 20 In Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, and West Virginia the
legal status of husband and wife still retains many of its common law
disabilities including the right to contract with each other.2 1 In Mis-
souri the purposes for which a woman is considered a femme sole are
expressly limited by statute.2 2 California recognizes the common law
disability of the wife in the matter of litigation against the husband
with an exception in the case of actions affecting property when she is
separated from her husband.23 The weight to be given to the decisions
comprising the majority position is further weakened by strong dis-
senting opinions and the doubts which others openly express as to
the soundness of their decisions.24
In the case of Phillips et. al. v. Graves et. al.,25 decided in 1870,
the Ohio Supreme Court enunciated the common law doctrine of the
legal identity of husband and wife. This doctrine was modified by
legislative action on March 19, 1887, by the enactment of the Ohio
Married Women's Act.26 This Act provides that neither the husband
nor the wife has any interest in the property of the other, that either
may contract as though unmarried, and that either may take, hold
or dispose of property as though unmarried. Since that time the
Ohio courts have aligned themselves with the majority of jurisdictions
by refusing to permit the husband or wife to bring an action for a
16 N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 57 (1939); Stouborough v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co.,
180 Misc. 339, 40 N.Y.S. 2d 480 (1943), afrd, 292 N.Y. 154, 54 N.E. 2d 342 (1944).
17 Alberts v. Alberts, 217 N.C. 443, 8 S.E. 2d 523 (1940).
18 Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 895, 87 P. 2d 660 (1939).
19 Scotvold v. Scotvold, 68 S.D. 58, 298 N.W. 266 (1941).
20 Comment, 4 FoRD. L. REv. 475 (1935).
21 See note 3 supra.
22 Mo. STAT. Ann. § 2998; Rogers v. Rogers, 265 Mo. 200, 177 S.W. 382 (1917).
23 Dunbar v. San Francisco - Oakland Terminal Rys., 54 Cal. App. 15, 201
Pac. 330 (1921).
24 Sykes v. Speer, 112 S.W. 422 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908); Thompson v. Thompson,
note 12 supra.
25 20 Ohio St. 371 (1870); see also Glidden, Murphin and Co. v. Taylor, 16
Ohio St. 517 (1866); Levi v. Earl, 80 Ohio St. 163 (1876).
26 OHIO GEN. CoDE §§ 8002-I to 8002-8, inclusive.
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personal tort against each other. On the other hand, Ohio's position
on their ability to sue each other for a property tort is rather vague.
In 1912 the Ohio Supreme Court decided the case of State of Ohio
v. Phillips27 which, although a criminal action based on a property
tort, has been cited in later decisions to support the position that
question was presented as to whether a wife could be convicted of
larceny for the conversion of personal property belonging to her
husband. The state contended that by virtue of Sections 7995 to 8004,
inclusive, of the Ohio General Code,28 the common law identity of
husband and wife had been abrogated, and that the wife was therefore
liable to prosecution. The court applied the canon that statutes in
derrogation of the common law must be strictly construed, saying, "An
intention of the legislature to abolish an established rule of the
common law ... must clearly and unmistakably appear," and held that
such an action could not be maintained. On its facts, this case seems
to have little bearing on the problem of tort liability, and, indeed, the
case has been distinguished by two later cases which have held it not
controlling where the husband and wife have separated.2 9 The case,
however, is important in this discussion because of dictum in the de-
cision to the effect that the peace and sanctity of the home and family
are the ultimate reason for the common law rule, and that if such an
action (criminal) were permitted it would also authorize a husband
or wife to maintain a civil action against the other for personal torts.
This language has been quoted with approval by the Ohio courts. In
Finn v. Finn3o a wife brought an action against her husband to re-
cover damages for personal injuries sustained by his alleged negligence
in the operation of the family car. The Court quoted with approval
the language in the Phillips case and stated that while the common
law unity of husband and wife no longer exists there remains a unity
of interest in the establishment of the home. The court added that
"It would seem that any policy that may add to the causes for dissen-
tion between husband and wife would be of doubtful benefit." A
similar fact situation was present in the case of Leonardi v. Leonardi.31
The court reached the same conclusion as in the Finn case, but with-
out mentioning that decision. The wife, plaintiff in the action, called
attention to Section 11245 of the Ohio General Code providing that
"A married woman shall sue and be sued as if she were unmarried, and
her husband be joined with her only when the cause of action is in
favor of or against both." The court considered this Section and
27 85 Ohio St. 317, 97 N.E. 976 (1912).
28 See note 26 supra for present statutory references.
28 Frazier v. The State of Ohio, 16 Ohio App. 9 (1922); Milwaukee Mechanics'
Ins. Co. v. Hefferman, 121 Ohio St. 499, 169 N.E. 573 (1929).
30 19 Ohio App. 302 (1924).
31 21 Ohio App. 110, 153 N.E. 93 (1925).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Sections 7995 to 8004, inclusive, of the Ohio General Code3 2 and con-
cluded that these Sections did not enlarge the right of action of either
the husband or the wife against the other for personal wrongs. This
court also quoted with approval the language of the Phillips case. In
addition the court, stated "To give either the husband or wife the
right to sue the other for injury sustained by reason of a negligent
act would strike at the very heart of the peaceable domestic relation of
the husband and wife and, further, at the happiness of the family."
Metropolitan Life Ins. v. Huff33 cited both the preceding cases as
authority for the proposition that a wife cannot maintain a personal
tort action against her husband.
On the question of the wife's right of action against her former
husband for a tort committed prior to the marriage, Ohio has again
refused to permit such an action. 34 In the later case of Lanno v. Elby3 5
the court held that even when the injury was received and the action
commenced prior to the marriage and an antenuptial agreement was
entered into purporting to give to the wife the right to maintain the
action after marriage, that the marriage destroyed the wife's right of
action.
Ohio's position on the question of the right of the husband or
wife to sue each other for a tort affecting their separate property is not
dearly established, since there is a dearth of cases upon this subject.
In Shafer v. Shafer3 6 the court held that Sections 7998, 7999, and 8001
of the Ohio General Code37 effected a complete emancipation of the
wife except as limited by such statutes, and that the wife could main-
tain as action for partition of real estate against her husband. In 1949,
in the case of Madget v. Madget,38 the court was faced with the ques-
tion as to whether the incapacity of the husband to sue his wife at
common law has survived the Ohio Married Women's Act and prevents
him from maintaining an action against his wife upon a cause of action
involving property rights. The court concluded that there was no case
in Ohio denying the right of the husband to maintain an action to
recover his property or to seek damages for its conversion. Ohio
Jurisprudence states that there is no statutory right for either spouse
to sue the other for an injury to property and cites Finn v. Finn as
authority.39 While it is true that a statement to that effect appears in
the case, it is mere dictum. The court turned to an examination of the
holdings in other jurisdictions and concluded that, while some con-
32 See note 26 supra for present statutory references.
33 48 Ohio App. 412, 194 N.E. 429 (1933).
34 Wirrig V. Harter, 29 Ohio L. Abs. 587 (1939).
35 78 Ohio App. 21, 68 N.E. 2d 813 (1946).
86 30 Ohio App. 298, 163 N.E. 507 (1928).
87 Present statutory references are OHIO GEN. CODE §§ 8002-4, 8002-5, and 8002-7.
88 85 Ohio App. 18, 87 N.E. 2d 918 (1949).
39 21 Ohio Jur. 502.
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flict exists, the weight of authority is in support of the allowance of
such actions. The court chose to follow the weight of authority and
held that, since the Ohio Married Women's Act permits the spouses to
hold property free from the common-law disabilities, the husband
could maintain the tort action of conversion against his wife. If the
Ohio courts choose to follow the reasoning of this case, the way is
open to permit any of the various tort actions affecting property be-
tween spouses.
Ohio and the majority of jurisdictions have promulgated four
chief reasons for refusing an action between spouses arising out of a
tort. The first of these is statutory interpretation, the maxim generally
applied being that statutes in derrogation of the common law should
be strictly construed. The second reason advanced is that the wife, or
husband, has other adequate remedies available to her, namely di-
vorce or criminal proceedings. The third reason is that the allowance
of such suits would open new avenues for fraud and collusion. The
fourth and the most frequently quoted reason is that such actions are
against public policy because they tend to bring about the dissolution
of the marriage relationship. Very few, if any, decisions are based upon
any single one of the above reasons but rely on several or all of them
in justifying their position. An example of this can be seen in the
case of Thompson v. Thompson40 in which can be found the first,
second, and fourth of the above reasons.
Let us examine the relative merit of these reasons. The maxim
that statutes in derrogation of the common law should be strictly con-
strued merits little consideration. The courts tend to fall back upon
this maxim not because of any intrinsic value which it has, but as a
justification for reaching a result influenced by the courts underlying
conception of the marriage relationship. The argment that the wife
has sufficient remedy in divorce actions and criminal proceedings
merits as little consideration. These actions may be adequate to pre-
vent future wrongs, but they afford no compensation for past in-
juries and in many instances, such as negligence, afford no remedy at
all. With regard to the danger of fraud and collusion, it has been as-
serted that such a policy would subject insurance companies to numer-
ous fraudulent claims. 4 ' A person pays for insurance to indemnify any
person whom he injures by his negligent conduct, and it is sufficiently
easy, if desired, to except the husband or wife from the contract of
insurance. 42 The fourth justification that tort actions between husband
and wife are against public policy appears more often than any of the
other three. It is said that such actions would disturb the domestic
tranquility of the marriage relationship, but it is difficult to see why
40 Note 12 supra.
41 Harvey v. Harvey, 239 Mich. 142, 214 N.V. 305 (1927).
42 Note, 4 Wis. L. REv. 37 (1926).
1952]
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the allowance of tort action would disturb domestic tranquility to any
greater extent than the divorce actions or criminal proceedings which
are suggested as alternative remedies. 43 If such a reason is accepted,
however, it is difficult to understand why such actions are refused even
after a divorce. Another apparently unanswered question, which might
be asked, is why the allowance of actions for personal injuries will
result in any greater domestic disturbance than do actions for injuries
to property, which are generally allowed.
What then is a possible solution? The best would seem to be that
of permitting tort actions between husband and wife both in respect
to property and personal injuries, but with limitations due to the
relationship of the parties.4 4 Husband and wife do not act toward
each other as total strangers and to treat them as such is to take a
position as unreasonable as the common law doctrine of indentity of
husband and wife. For this reason the marriage status should create a
presumption of consent to many acts which would be torts if committed
against a third person. The extent of this distinction can only be
determined by the common denominator of so many legal concepts,
time and experience.
Earl R. Miller.
43 Note, 26 COL. L. REv. 895 (1926); Comment, 26 ILL. L. Rv. 89 (1931).
41 See note 3 supra.
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